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Abstract
The purpose o f the paper is to investigate the effects o f unconscious versus conscious 
ways o f making decisions in a dynamic decision-making task. An experimental setting is 
used to study this question; three experimental groups are distinguished: immediate 
decision-making (only limited time for cognitive processing), considered decision­
making (time for conscious processing), and distracted decision-making (time for 
unconscious processing). As experimental stimulus, a simulator based on the Kaibab 
Plateau model is employed. Although more than 100 subjects have been tested so far, 
group differences are not significant for most data examined. Implications comprise the 
improvement o f the experiment in order to derive at more substantial results. The value 
o f the paper lies in the fact that it connects to a recent discussion in psychology and 
transfers it into a domain in the core interest o f the system dynamics community: 
decision-making in situations with dynamic complexity.
Keywords: dynamic decision-making, unconscious information processing, dynamic 
complexity, experiment
The motivation for this paper came from the question, what we—as researchers of 
decision-making—would recommend managers: deciding “straight from the gut” 
(Welch and Byrne, 2003) or “don’t trust your gut” (Bonabeau, 2003)? Thus, the purpose 
of the paper is to investigate the effects of unconscious versus conscious ways of 
making decisions in a dynamic decision-making task. More specifically, we want to 
research the question if humans perform better when they have time to think about a 
dynamic problem, or when time for deliberate consideration is limited, either because 
decisions have to be made immediately or because persons are distracted during their 
preparation time.
In the light of some recent findings in psychology but also according to some 
anecdotal evidence, it seems that unconscious forms of decision-making are more
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effective than conscious forms, more often than expected by proponents of rational 
problem solving. However, these findings were often achieved when static and single 
tasks had been involved. So, in accordance with a common interest in the system 
dynamics community, we want to transfer experiments on the effectiveness of 
conscious versus unconscious processing of information to decision-making into a 
dynamic context.
To this end, the paper is divided in five sections. In the first section, we review 
the status of the (mostly psychological) literature on conscious versus unconscious 
processing in decision-making. In the section after that, characteristics of dynamic tasks 
are briefly explained; it is proposed that most experiments on the conscious/unconscious 
difference employ static and single decision tasks. In the third section, the design of an 
experiment is presented that should help to evaluate the effects of unconscious 
information processing in environments, where dynamic complexity is high. The results 
of this experiment are shown and discussed in the fourth section. The paper closes with 
a section that discusses implications for research and the management of dynamically 
complex systems; issues for further research are identified.
Evidence in favor of unconscious deliberation when making decisions
Recently ‘unconscious processing’ of information and subsequent decision-making has 
received substantial attention in psychological research (Mandler 1984; Oatley, 1992; 
Damasio, 1994; Wilson, 2002; Dijksterhuis et al., 2006). While authors use different 
terminology (‘unconscious’, ‘recognition-primed’, ‘deliberation without attention’, 
‘thinking without thinking’), they basically describe the same phenomenon: making 
decisions without conscious consideration of what the best decision would be. In this 
paper, we use the term “unconscious information processing in decision-making” to 
refer to this phenomenon. Thus, not the act of making a decision itself is unconscious, 
but the preceding cognitive processes are not consciously related to the decision that has 
to be made.
Wilson (2002: 19) illustrates the crucial part unconscious cognitive processes 
play with an example of a man who loses his sense of proprioception (i.e. the sense of 
the relative position of body parts). With a great deal of effort, the patient had to replace 
unconscious proprioception with conscious control of his body. Whenever his 
concentration was lost he would loose control over his body and end up ‘in a heap of 
tangled limbs on the floor’.
On the basis of experimental as well as real world purchase decisions, 
Dijksterhuis et al. (2006) conclude that unconscious thinkers are better able to make the 
best choice among complex products. Conscious thinkers are better able to make the 
best choice among simple products. Popular books such as Blink (Gladwell, 2005) 
maintain that expert decision-making is often instantaneous, difficult to access by 
conscious processes and in specific circumstances leads to high quality decisions.
A classic example of expert decision-making, reported by Simon as early as 
1957, already has many of these features. Simon studies a chess player who tries to 
decide on the next move in a game, an activity which is thought to involve a highly 
analytical approach. Expert chess players indicate that good moves usually come to 
mind after a few seconds of looking at the board, after which considerable time is spent
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on verifying that the move does not have hidden weaknesses (Simon, 1987: 59). So 
although a decision comes to mind almost immediately, a more analytical and time­
consuming process is used to check this first option. This analysis may reveal that the 
first option is biased. Simon (1987) describes how in a situation of stress, for example, 
intuitive decisions may be based on ‘primitive urges’ such as the need to reduce 
embarrassment or guilt. Research in biases and heuristics (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman, 
1971; 1974; Sterman, 1989; Gilovich et al., 2002) shows convincingly that human 
judgment is biased in systematic ways.
Gigerenzer and colleagues argue that the same simplifying heuristics that are 
responsible for cognitive biases are the cognitive mechanisms “that make us smart” 
(Gigerenzer and Todd, 2001). Only because they allow us to make fast decisions that 
are frugal in the sense that they do not require much information as input, we are able to 
survive in a complex world. Thus, Gigerenzer assumes that unconscious processing is a 
basic characteristic and success factor of human beings.
In summary we can conclude that—despite all the biases and heuristics related 
to human decision-making and all claims by proponents of rational decision-making— 
there is some evidence that unconscious processing of information for decision-making 
is effective in many occasions. This paper tries to shed some additional light in the 
context of dynamic tasks, which differ from the static, single tasks mostly used in 
experiments of decision-making.
Decision-making in dynamic environments
Individual decision-making in dynamic systems differs from the static tasks which are 
mostly used when unconscious processing before decisions is studied. We define 
dynamic decision-making as characterized by three features:
1. not one, but a series of decisions have to be made (repeated decision-making),
2. the system’s state changes over time based on past decisions, and
3. there is some element of time pressure involved, although not all persons
experience it at the same level.
Thus, the current state of a dynamic decision-making environment depends on the past 
system states and the decisions that have been made in the past.
The distinction between static and dynamic decision-making is related to the 
different types of complexity people in decision situations experience. Here, detail 
complexity and dynamic complexity are to be differentiated (Senge, 1990; Sterman, 
2000). Detail complexity can be divided further into three sub-components: number of 
elements in a system, number of connections between elements, and types of functional 
relations between elements (Milling, 2002). The dynamic component of complexity 
comprise the variability of a system’s behavior over time and the variability of a 
system’s structure (assuming that a system can stay the same when its structure changes 
as long as its underlying goal set is not substantially modified; cf. GroBler et al., 2006). 
An important proposition for this study is that in dynamic decision-making, effects of 
dynamic complexity are prevalent that do not occur in static decision-making. Thus, 
static and dynamic decision-making might have different characteristics and success 
strategies, due to the existence of dynamic complexity in the latter.
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In several fields of expertise, decision makers confronted with time pressure and 
uncertainty typically carried out the first course of action that came to mind. This idea is 
similar to Simon’s assertion that ‘intuition and judgment -  at least goodjudgment -  are 
simply analyses frozen into habit (1987: 63). This process, termed ‘recognition-primed’ 
decision making, actually consists of a range of strategies. In its simplest form, the 
strategy comes down to seizing up the situation and responding with the initial option 
identified. If the situation is not clear, the decision maker may supplement this strategy 
by mentally simulating the events leading up to the situation. In a situation that is 
changing continuously, a different kind of simulation may be applied as well. Here, the 
proposed plan of action is mentally simulated to see if unintended consequences arise 
that are unacceptable. In a review of these studies, Klein (1998) considers the conditions 
under which recognition-primed decision making applies: when the decision maker has 
considerable expertise relevant to the situation at hand, is under time-pressure, and 
when there is uncertainty and/ or ill-defined goals. Recognition-primed decision making 
is less likely to be used with highly combinatorial problems, when a justification for the 
decision is required, and when the views of different stakeholders have to be taken into 
account.
From our previous description it is clear that dynamic decision-making falls into 
the former category: since only individual decision-making is studied, no stakeholders 
exist and there is no need to explain (or justify) decisions. By definition, dynamic tasks 
involve a degree of time pressure and uncertainty about the system’s future, which are 
based on the dynamic complexity of the situation and the difficulties people have with 
estimating developments over time (Dorner, 1980). Thus, it seems likely that for 
individuals confronted with dynamic problems, unconscious processing or recognition- 
primed decision-making is the most used approach.
In summary, in dynamic situations decision-makers experience the effects of not 
only detail complexity like in many static tasks. Also, dynamic complexity plays an 
important role and might hamper effective decision-making. The hypothesis of this 
research is the advantage of unconscious processing of information in decision-making 
for dynamic tasks. Thus, we want to find out whether the superiority of unconscious 
decision-making holds for dynamic tasks or whether dynamics requires a thorough 
consideration of the situation proves to be more useful.
An experiment to investigate the effects of unconscious information processing in 
dynamic decision-making
We investigate whether unconscious deliberation of the situation is superior to 
conscious deliberation in dynamic decision-making with the help of a laboratory 
experiment with three experimental groups. In group 1, subjects have to start making 
decisions right after the task has been introduced to them (“immediate condition”). 
Group 2 is the experimental group that represents conscious decision-making 
(“consideration condition”). Subjects in this group are given three minutes to 
contemplate about the task before they are allowed to start with actually using the 
simulator. In experimental group 3, unconscious decision-making is tested (“distracted 
condition”). Subjects in this group are also not allowed to start using the simulator 
immediately but have to wait for three minutes. However, in contrast to the 
consideration condition, they are occupied by another cognitive task during this time (in
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our case, solving simple Sudoku puzzles). A timetable of the experiment is depicted in 
Table 1, which is the result of two trial runs of the experiment with colleagues and 
students.









0 Welcome Welcome Welcome
2 Instruction Instruction Instruction
10 X1 Y1 Z1
20 Break
23 break break
25 X2 Y2 Z2
35 Break
38 break break
40 KnowledgeT KnowledgeT KnowledgeT
50 Bio Bio Bio
55 Debrief Debrief Debrief
60 End end end
Instruction: explain task to subjects, clarify how to use the simulator
X1, X2: two game runs, 50 decisions each, with limited decision time (“immediate condition”)
Y1, Y2: two game runs, 50 decisions each, with time to consider task before round 1 (“consideration 
condition”)
Z1, Z2: two game runs, 50 decisions each, with time in which subjects are distracted before round 1 
(“distraction condition”)
KnowledgeT: test of knowledge about the system 
Bio: Biographical data (sex, age, studies, experience, etc.)
Debrief: short explanation of experiment to subjects
As dynamic task in the experiment we use a simulator (Rouwette et al., 2004) 
which is based on the Kaibab Plateau model. This model is well documented in the 
literature (Senge, 1980) -  Figure 1 depicts the overshoot and collapse behavior of a deer 
population which is represented in the model (for overshoot and collapse cf. Senge, 
1990). The model is based on real events, happening in the Kaibab national park in 
Arizona between 1900 and 1950. Thus, in the figure estimated historical data is shown 
as well; differences to the simulation outcomes are due to estimations (in the model as 
well as in the real data) and factors not considered in the model, for instance weather 
conditions. This model has been used in a variety of educational settings, for example to 
explain dynamic complexity resulting from feedback loops (Goodman, 1974; Roberts et 
al., 1983; Sterman, 1984; Sterman, 1994) or unintended consequences of human 
policies in ecological systems (Ford, 1999; the human interference with nature was the 





D ee r: Historical
Figure 1: Overshoot and collapse o f deer population in the Kaibab model and reality
In the simulator, the model is used with one extension: now users can decide— 
for each simulated year—on a harvest rate of deer (meaning either the hunting of deer 
or the transfer of deer to other regions). By sensibly controlling the number of deer, it is 
possible to avoid the enormous increase of deer and the subsequent collapse of the 
population due to too little food available. The deer harvest rate is the only decision 
users have to make. The user interface of the simulator is depicted in Figure 2. The 
model is developed using Vensim; the user interface is programmed in Sable (for 
another version of a Kaibab simulator see Ford, 1997, and McCormack and Ford, 1998; 
in their simulator the number of predators can be controlled by subjects as well). The 
goal for subjects is to stabilize the deer population on the highest level possible over the 
total simulation run.
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Figure 2: Screenshot o f Kaibab simulator
Subjects are participants of a course in the business administration bachelor 
program at Radboud University. They were told that participating in the experiment is 
part of the course; however, it was clear that performance in the experiment would not 
influence grading. Subjects’ performance is assessed based on a score that combines the 
stability of the population with the populations’ height, aggregated over all 50 simulated 
years. Thus, performance is the average number of deer divided by the standard 
deviation of the population from the average.
Due to the nature of dynamic tasks (which by definition take a while because 
several decisions have to be made and effects only occur after some time), we assume 
our results to be affected in two ways:
1. Differences between the experimental groups will be rather low 
because—during the 50 simulation rounds that the subjects play per 
experimental run—even in the immediate condition there is some time 
for at least unconscious processing of information; similarly, subjects in 
the distraction condition will not be distracted during this time. Thus, 
differences between groups result from the initial differences in the 
experimental groups that might have only a weak effect on their 
performance.
2. Following the reasoning in 1., we assume that differences between 
groups will become smaller in the course of the experiment. In particular, 
differences in experimental run 2 should be much smaller (or even non­
existent) compared to experimental run 1.
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Results of group comparisons
In the experiment, which was conducted on June 12-14, 2008, 120 subjects took part. 
After eliminating 18 cases due to missing or incomplete data, the following group sizes 
were achieved: Immediate condition n=41, consideration condition n=30, distraction 
condition n=31. In total, 58 subjects are male, 44 are female; the age of subjects ranges 
from 19 to 30, with the average at about 21. No subject reported to have known the 
Kaibab Plateau task before. Since subjects were randomly assigned to a time slot and 
time slots were randomly allocated to an experimental condition, we assume that 
experimental groups are randomly composed. At the end of the experiment, subjects 
were asked about the degree of difficulty of the task, the time pressure they experienced 
and their estimation of the realism of the task. None of these items showed significant 
differences between experimental groups.
Results of subjects in terms of average deer population are far from optimal. As 
Sterman (1981) indicates, a deer population of 32,000 can be sustained without 
substantial fluctuations. In comparison to this, the average population size over all 
subjects in the experiment is 9,433 for the first run and 11,505 for the second run. While 
one can find a significant increase of the average size of the deer population from run 
one to run 2, it goes along with a significantly larger standard deviation. In other words, 
while subjects manage to increase the average population size, fluctuations around the 
mean increase as well, an indication for the common overshoot-and-collapse behavior 
of the system. Accordingly, the performance score (mean / standard deviation) is not 
significantly different between the first and the second run over all subjects.
Table 2 and Table 3 show the results of an analysis of variance for the first and 
the second run, respectively. We tested the between group differences for the three 
experimental groups for the performance score. For both runs, within group differences 
are much bigger than between group differences. There are no statistically significant 
differences between the three experimental groups concerning performance score (in 
both simulator runs).
Table 2: ANOVA results for performance score in first simulation run
summary
groups count sum mean variance
immediate 41 232.133 5.661 85.836
consideration 30 207.248 6.908 139.573
distraction
ANOVA





square sum F P critical F
between groups 28.564 2 14.282 0.131 0.876 3.088
within groups 10753.692 99 108.623
total 10782.257 101
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Table 3: ANOVA results for performance score in second simulation run
summary
groups count sum mean variance
immediate 41 290.228 7.078 193.708
consideration 30 163.887 5.462 50.942
distraction
ANOVA





square sum F P critical F
between groups 55.235 2 27.617 0.255 0.774 3.088
within groups 10680.439 99 107.883
total 10735.675 101
In the knowledge test conducted at the end of the experiment, subjects had to 
answer twelve questions concerning their understanding and recollection of the task. 
Each correct answer was coded as one point, leading to a maximum of twelve points in 
the knowledge test. An analysis of variances between groups for results in the test 
indicates group differences. In order to find out, which groups differed from each other 
and what the direction of the differences is, we ran T-tests that are summarized in 
Table 4.
Table 4: T-test results for knowledge test
distraction consideration distraction immediate consideration immediate
mean 7.806 7.467 7.806 8.634 7.467 8.634
variance 3.428 2.051 3.428 2.088 2.051 2.088
n 31 30 31 41 30 41
pooled variance 2.751 2.662 2.072
df 59 70 69
t value 0.800 -2.131 -3.376
P(T<=t) double-
sided 0.427 0.037 0.001
critical t-value
(double sided) 2.001 1.994 1.995
Between the distraction and the consideration group, no statistical differences 
can be found. However, there are significant differences between the immediate and the 
distraction group, and between the immediate and the consideration group. In both 
cases, subjects in the immediate group scored better in the knowledge test than subjects 
in the other group.
Implications and further research
The results of our experiment are rather disappointing, since none of the initially 
hypothesized differences between groups could be found. Although this result might
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simply represent a fact (i.e., there are no differences between conscious or unconscious 
decision-making for dynamic tasks), we assume that it is more likely an artifact of the 
experimental design and the task that we used. Therefore, this section discusses 
explanations for our results and possible changes in experimental set-up.
Before concentrating on the results concerning simulation performance, the one 
significant difference between groups is discussed—which is the difference for the 
knowledge test. The direction of the difference (the immediate group scored better than 
both, the consideration and the distraction group) is counter-intuitive. The group that 
had the least possibility to cognitively process information about the tasks (either 
consciously or unconsciously) scored best. We can only explain this in terms of a 
shorter over-all assessment time (subjects being more concentrated and motivated) and 
with a shorter time from reading the instruction until filling-out the test questionnaire. 
Since some of the questions are just testing the recollection of facts, a shorter time span 
might help recalling these facts.
Since subjects’ performance does not significantly increase from run 1 to run 2, 
no learning seems to have taken place. While subjects achieve a higher average deer 
population in the second run, the standard deviation increases as well. We hypothesize 
that subjects are not able to comprehend the structure of the system and they cannot 
deduct the corresponding behavior mode (overshoot-and-collapse).
Concerning the not existing group differences for task performance, our 
assumption is that the experimental setting was not differentiating enough between 
groups. First, the three minutes time span for consideration or distraction might simply 
be too short, compared to the total duration of the experiment and the complexity of the 
task. Second, the nature of dynamic tasks makes it difficult to prevent all subjects from 
consciously or unconsciously processing task information during the game run, since a 
dynamic task takes a while by definition (and during this time, experimental groups are 
not treated differently any more). One suggestion to mitigate this effect would be that 
subjects in the consideration group have to verbally explain all their decisions and that 
subjects in the distraction group must solve a brief, not-related “distraction puzzle” 
before their decisions.
Another point to consider is the complexity of the task. While structurally not 
too simple (consisting of more than a dozen feedback loops, two integration 
structures—deer and food—, and some non-linear relationships—for instance, the food 
regeneration time), participants in two pre-tests considered the task to be 
understandable. However, obviously there is a substantial gap between knowing what 
one should do in principle, and actually doing it by controlling a dynamic system that is 
not open for detailed inspection (only behavior graphs and the principle system 
structure is shown). Although we assume that making the simulation more transparent 
might help subjects achieving a better result, we question whether this would be more 
realistic and it would interfere with the experimental setting because then subjects 
would need a lot of time to explore the system.
The last improvement point concerns the performance score that we used. We 
gave subjects a verbal goal to achieve (“stabilize the deer population on the highest 
possible level”), however we did not explain in detail how their performance score is 
calculated and did not display it during simulation. Furthermore, there is the principle 
question whether this performance score is appropriate, or whether another (simpler?)
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score should be used. This new score could also be a qualitative assessment of the 
behavior mode of the deer population that the subjects achieved.
In summary, we believe we address a relevant question. Extending the existing 
research about unconscious decision-making to dynamic tasks is worthwhile, since most 
decision settings in reality are dynamic and research shows that individuals can deal 
insufficiently with dynamics. However, further attempts have to be made to investigate 
the effects of conscious versus unconscious decision-making with an experimental 
research design.
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